ABSTRACT Accusations of failure by elements of the US intelligence community (IC) have followed in the wake of nearly every war and terrorist bombing since Japan's successful strike on Pearl Harbor in 1941. This article will illustrate how some problems that exist inside the 'intelligence-policy nexus' are beyond the control of the IC. By investigating the dynamics and tensions that exist between producers of intelligence (the IC) and the consumers of those products (policy-makers), we review three different types of alleged failure. First, by revisiting the Chinese intervention in Korea, we show that a rarely listed case in the literature is in fact a classic example of producer-based failure generated from within the IC. However, in our study of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War (1968), we show that the alleged intelligence failure by producers should be more accurately described as a 'failure of intelligence' by consumers. Third, by revisiting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), we conclude that there existed neither a producer nor a consumer failure. The Carter Administration made a conscious policy choice to act surprised (when it was not).
Introduction
At what point do policy-makers decide to pay closer attention the nation's intelligence organizations? The answer historically has been simple: when an event takes place that surprises the government, alarms the public, and threatens national security. In the popular media (print and online news, radio-talk shows, and television punditry) the relentless drive for audience share generates many accusations of 'failure,' some of which are true and others not. For instance, most recently in April 2013, within hours of the identification of the key suspects in the Boston Marathon bombing (and their possible ties to Russia), accusations of an FBI intelligence failure were being blasted across the media sphere, and Senator Lindsey Graham called for hearings. 1 For the popular press, conventional wisdom holds that a fully functioning intelligence agency should never be surprised. 2 For many pundits, surprise equates to intelligence failure and failure inspires calls for corrective action. Some politicians invariably get drawn into the fray.
The January 2011 issue of the popular publication Foreign Policy got into the act by reporting on 'the Ten Biggest American Intelligence Failures.' authors using the best materials available at the time but, as more data become available, history must be revisited. The phrase 'available at the time' is the key point of departure for this essay. Over time documents are declassified, archives become accessible, and key participants write memoirs that sometimes change our understanding of the actual circumstances surrounding some of these famous 'failures'. As such, in this essay we seek to show that the 'failure' label is often misleading, or the scenarios involved are more complex. In our second and third cases (Tet and Afghanistan), we show evidence that key decision-makers were informed by the US intelligence community (IC) that the enemy was going to attack, but choose not to respond for political reasons. In coverage of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War in 1968, we outline how the often-reported 'intelligence failure' attributed to the CIA was instead more of a 'failure of intelligence' by the Johnson White House. In the former phrase, the term 'intelligence' refers to the aggregate system of information gathering and analysis by the producers of intelligence (aka, the IC) and the reporting of their findings to consumers of intelligence: policymakers and military commanders. In the second phrase, 'intelligence' refers to the conscious policy choices and decisions made by those consumers of the intelligence products. In the Afghanistan case, we revisit the 1979 Soviet invasion; an episode which we suggest is neither a producer or consumer failure, and not a failure at all. Indeed, the Afghan scenario represents an example how overriding strategic calculations can best explain why the Carter Administration chose not to try and pre-empt the Soviet invasion. Further, we uncover and further investigate an explosive claim by a key Carter Administration official (National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski) that the Soviet invasion was actually the result of a covert gambit designed to weaken the USSR by luring the communists into an Afghan quagmire.
However, we are not apologists for the CIA or the wider American IC. We will show in our first case study, the Korean War, that the Foreign Policy list overlooked one of the IC's greatest producer failures: assessments of Chinese intentions prior to the onset of their intervention in 1950. Our analysis touches upon the theme that intra-war surprises (as witnessed both in Korea and Tet) are enabled by a set of psychological, political, and relational dynamics amongst consumers and producers. The discussion of these two cases highlights how the intelligence is often politicized because the incentives to show progress and success in these wars encouraged the suppression of warnings of dramatic enemy resilience and the danger of a reversal of fortune. This theme does not apply to the Afghan case because it is a war-initiation, rather than an intra-war scenario.
Framing the Issue
The literature on the intelligence process tends to treat the reoccurring problems of failure as a dichotomous phenomenon that can either be attributed to pathologies in the intelligence community (e.g. the CIA and other 'producers') or by pathologies in the 'consumers' (e.g. civilian politicians and senior military officials). However, very few studies in the literature on intelligence failure pay enough attention to the dynamics of sustained interaction between intelligence producers and policy-makers. Some prominent scholars focus on the starkly different milieus in which consumers and producers operate and pinpoint how different subcultures and incentive structures make it difficult for consumers and producers to work together effectively. 10 Our cases highlight the extent to which each Administration or individual military command tends to instantiate a unique set of norms which shapes the way producers and consumers interact. Thus it is sometimes not the differences between producer and consumer that need to be closely analyzed, but rather the patterns of sustained interaction between the two types of actors. We seek to focus on these patterns by using concepts drawn from scholarship that has focused primarily on the interagency process.
Professor Amy Zegart, one of the leading scholars of the interagency, has used an approach that combines elements of realism, institutionalism, and organizational theory to analyze the 'whole of government' process. To date, Zegart (and others) have tended to generate predictions that pathologies in the interagency process will stem mostly from a president's inability to exert sufficient oversight and control over intransigent operational agencies: both the formulation and implementation of national security policy. Rooted in microeconomic models, Zegart's institutional/bureaucratic approach tends to focus on information asymmetries between top decision-makers, who are conceptualized as principals, and lower-level bureaucratic actors, who are conceptualized as agents.
11 This analytical approach posits that information asymmetries lead to the existence of principal-agent pathologies that allow the lower-level bureaucratic entities or agents to pursue their own bureaucratic interests and to resist the policy guidance of the principals to varying degrees. 12 In a recent study, Chun and Jones show how these information asymmetries can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard dynamics that can undercut the ability of the principals to exert control. 13 In the context of the intelligence process and national security policy-making, the information asymmetries and conflicts of interest that comprise the principal agent problem are exacerbated by a significant cultural divide that often separates intelligence professionals and policy-makers. 14 In recognition of these cultural differences, we will use the terms producer and consumer in this paper to denote principals and agents that constitute the 'intelligence-policy nexus' within the national security bureaucracy. While we don't dispute Zegart and others' general findings, our following analysis suggest that either the principals (consumers) or the agents (producers) can be the primary locus of failure depending on the situation. Two of our case studies highlight the causal significance of conscious action on the part of either producers or consumers to distort intelligence in order to support a pre-existing policy agenda.
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Our case studies also explore the broader issue of politicization of intelligence. 16 As Richard Betts has argued persuasively, there exists a broad spectrum of intelligence politicization, and on the lower end the infusion of political significance into analysis can actually be beneficial to the extent that it allows the analytical product to have more relevance for policy-makers.
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Following Betts, we define politicization as clearly pathological when it 'suppresses or distorts the truth to promote a political agenda '. 18 This pathological threshold is clearly crossed in two of our case studies where either a rogue producer or a rogue consumer intentionally distorted analytical products in order to provide support for pre-existing policy agendas. Ultimately, however, it is the patterns of sustained interaction between producers and consumers in what some intelligence scholars have called the 'intelligencepolicy nexus' where the complexity and richness of these stories are found.
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Case 1: Korea
The failure on the part of the intelligence community to predict the Chinese intervention into the Korean War has all of the hallmarks of a producer-based intelligence failure. Analysts and managers in both military intelligence units and the CIA had timely access to warning indicators at the tactical, operational, and strategic level which established both Chinese capability 14 and intention to intervene militarily if American forces moved above the 38th parallel into North Korean territory. The damage done as a result of this intelligence failure, both to American strategic interests and in the form of large-scale casualties inflicted on its forces fighting in North Korea, was extensive. The causes of failure in this case fall into both the people and process categories. From a process standpoint, the failure to predict Chinese entry into the war is noteworthy for the extent to which the entire intelligence community (and the policy principals for that matter) was dependent upon General Douglas MacArthur's Far East Command for the evolving situation in Korea. 20 The case also provides strong empirical support for the principal-agent paradigm of bureaucratic policy process pathologies. From an individual level perspective, this case is even more noteworthy for the extent to which one individual, Major General Charles Willoughby, performed as a rogue producer, consciously shaping the intelligence product to downplay the possibility of Chinese military intervention.
Willoughby's pattern of behavior during this episode is an amalgam of Bar Joseph and Levy's 'intelligence to please' and 'organizational restructuring' forms of conscious action intelligence distortion. 21 Willoughby appears to have tailored his analytical products because he knew that the threat of Chinese intervention might cause civilian leaders to force MacArthur to halt his advance to the Yalu River. There is also evidence that, in addition to tailoring the analytical product to facilitate MacArthur's operational agenda in Korea, Willoughby willfully impeded the upward flow of intelligence that pointed to Chinese intention to intervene, thus constituting what Bar Joseph and Levy refer to as organizational restructuring. 22 Perhaps because it was heavily dependent upon the Willoughby's Far East Command's (FEC) intelligence products on the situation in Korea, CIA analysis followed a similar pattern of processing incoming warning indicators with rationalizations that downplayed the threat of Chinese intervention. China would refrain from allowing its soldiers to participate in the Korean War because such a provocative action would be discouraged by the Soviets who were concerned with avoiding an all-out global war with the USA. This was based on a widely shared assumption in the intelligence community and among policy principals that the Chinese were a mere satellite of the Soviets, and that the former would never initiate a major confrontation with the West without explicit authorization from the latter. 24 Thus it was assumed that Chinese behavior in Korea would be shaped by Soviet interests rather than by Chinese interests. To the extent that such assumptions persisted over the July to November time period, this may suggest a number of cognitive psychological explanations for the failure to predict the Chinese intervention.
Mounting Evidence of Chinese Capabilities and Intentions to Intervene
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The warnings continued to accumulate. An FEC intelligence report in late August estimated that there were nearly a quarter-million PLA troops and another 374,000 Chinese militia troops stationed in Manchuria near the Korean border. 26 The Chinese government, using domestic propaganda outlets and diplomatic channels, began to express concern publicly about the prospects of the defeat of the North Korean Army and the occupation by American and UN troops. 27 A CIA memo issued on 8 September reported that the Chinese had over 200,000 PLA forces in Manchuria near the border with Korea, and that the Chinese were providing covert assistance to North Korean forces, but still concluded that overt Chinese intervention was unlikely without Soviet authorization.
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In late September after the successful Inchon invasion clearly put the North Korean forces on the defensive, Chinese officials sent a flurry of statements through diplomatic channels designed to warn the United States that China would not stand by and let its ally be defeated. 29 These signals culminated on 2 October with a clear warning from Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou En-Lai which he conveyed to the United States via the Indian Ambassador to Peking, K.M. Pannikar. Zhou told the Pannikar that: 'The US troops are going to cross the 38 th Parallel in an attempt to extend the war. If the US troops really do so, we cannot sit idly by and remain indifferent. We will intervene'. 30 To this point, the American intelligence community had only had operational indicators that pointed to a Chinese capability to intervene. Now they had a clear strategic warning from the highest levels of the Chinese government. 
Willoughby's Manipulation of the Intelligence
It should be noted that General Willoughby personally supervised the production of the Daily Intelligence Summaries (DIS) that were the single most important source of intelligence on Korea for both the Pentagon and for the civilian policy-makers in Washington.
31 These DIS's provided the basis for CIA's Daily Summaries and accounted for 90 per cent of the Pentagon's intelligence flow on the situation in Korea. 32 In the 3 October DIS, Willoughby's staff cited evidence that there were now 20 PLA divisions in North Korea and acknowledged that this represented a substantial capability for intervention. 33 That same DIS acknowledged Zhou En Lai's recent warnings that China is prepared to intervene and concluded that such threats must be taken seriously. 34 This report thus shows that the FEC G-2 was aware of both Chinese intentions and capabilities to intervene, but within a period of a few days, the analysis from Willoughby's staff began to change in ways that downplayed both China's intentions and its capabilities to intervene decisively. Another DIS, just three days later, revised its estimate of the number of Chinese PLA divisions in Northern Korea down from 20 to nine.
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During the second week of October, field reports indicated that large numbers of PLA troops were pouring into North Korea, and that even larger numbers were massed on the border in Manchuria. 36 In a series of DIS's issued during the second week of October, FEC G-2 undermined these field reports, stating at one point that there was 'no conclusive evidence' of Chinese troops in North Korea. 37 Another DIS during this period concluded that Zhou En Lai's recent warnings amounted to an attempt at 'diplomatic blackmail.'
38 During this same two-week period in early October, the intelligence requirement priority given to assessing the threat of Chinese intervention was reduced. On 3 October, the Chinese threat was the top priority, but by 13 October it was dropped to the third intelligence requirement priority.
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What might explain these behaviors? Justin Haynes argues persuasively that Willoughby was consciously altering the FEC G-2 assessments so as to downplay the threat of Chinese intervention in the run-up to his boss General MacArthur's important 15 October meeting with Truman at Wake Island.
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Truman and his top advisors had become increasingly alarmed by the prospect of Chinese intervention over the prior month, and it was possible that such concern could bring Truman to order MacArthur to slow or even halt his march before the final destruction of the North Korean Army. 41 This behavior is consistent with Bar-Joseph and Levy's 'intelligence to please' form of conscious intelligence distortion. 42 During the month of October there is also some evidence that Willoughby may have engaged in what Bar-Joseph and Levy classify as the 'organizational restructuring' form of conscious intelligence distortion. Working out of an East Asian location, the CIA had established contacts with former nationalist Chinese military officers who were now embedded in PLA units, and these sources were reporting that large numbers of PLA forces were being moved from the South of China up to the Manchurian border with North Korea. 43 Some of these former nationalist sources put the number of PLA forces on the Manchurian border at 300,000.
44 When Willoughby found out about this CIA operation and the resulting intelligence being yielded, he threatened to close down all CIA operations in the area if they didn't stop passing this intelligence to Washington.
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There is also evidence that Willoughby took conscious steps to ensure that tactical and operational intelligence reports from the field would not make their way into the DIS's. Often this took the form of cherry-picking tactical intelligence that came from the growing numbers of interrogations of Chinese POWs in October and November. 46 In one particularly dramatic instance, Willoughby engaged in some very creative accounting that ended up with a nearly 70 per cent underestimation of the numbers of PLA forces in a particular sector. In a 13 November report, Willoughby took intelligence from interrogations that identified PLA units from four separate armies in North Korea However, he minimized the order of battle conclusions by only counting the troop strength from the four individual units (e.g. the battalions) from which the interrogated PLA POWs came instead of extrapolating the troop strength of the entire PLA armies they represented.
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The Korean War Intelligence Failure in Perspective It is clear that the inability to assess correctly Chinese intentions to intervene in the Korean War in the fall of 1950 represents a major producer-based intelligence failure. It is also clear that Major General Charles Willoughby was acting as a rogue producer who intentionally produced 'intelligence to please' his boss General MacArthur. Because the rest of the intelligence community and the Washington interagency were so dependent upon 41 Willoughby for their intelligence, his efforts at conscious intelligence distortion had a whole of government type of adverse effect. Willoughby's failure allowed the entire American government (figuratively) and the soldiers of the Eighth Army and X Corps (literally) to march headlong into a trap that had been set for them by the Chinese PLA in North Korea.
While it is clear that Willoughby was distorting intelligence, there is also evidence that MacArthur had consciously created a command environment in the Far East Command (FEC), where unquestioning support for his preferences was expected, and where dissent and analytical questioning were not tolerated. 48 Willoughby created a similar command environment within FEC G-2. 49 This raises an interesting paradox when one attempts to view this episode through the lens of the consumer-producer paradigm. If the consumer (MacArthur) makes it clear to his producer (Willoughby) that he expects intelligence products that provide strong support for his own operational agenda (e.g. march to the Yalu and destruction of the DKPA by Christmas), and the producer complies by distorting intelligence to support the operational agenda, is this really a valid example of a producer problem? One could make the argument that in the end Willoughby didn't do his boss any favors by providing the intelligence that allowed the tragic march into the teeth of the Chinese ambush to continue, and in that sense the producer let the consumer down. Regardless, Korea is one of the greatest IC failures in American history.
Case 2: Tet Offensive, Vietnam, 1968
On 30 January 1968, at the start of the Vietnamese New Year holiday (Tet), communist forces launched simultaneous attacks across South Vietnam in an effort to generate popular uprisings, delegitimize the South Vietnamese government, and deliver a massive symbolic defeat to the United States. In strict military terms, the Tet Offensive was a tactical disaster for the communist forces: bringing thousands of casualties that would forever cripple the Viet Cong as an effective fighting force in the South. Viewed from a political-strategic standpoint, however, Tet dealt a devastating psychological blow that accelerated America's withdrawal. However, some of the politically damage might have been mitigated if policy-making principals in Washington and top military commanders in Saigon had heeded the fairly clear warnings from the CIA's Saigon station. Regrettably, these warnings were undercut by senior level managers at CIA headquarters, who took steps to see that they were not taken seriously by the policy-making principals. Thus, although the Tet Offensive is often listed by as an example of a producer-based intelligence failure, this characterization is not convincing. The breakdown occurred not in the collection or analysis stages, but rather at the intelligence management level where the line between producer and consumer is sometimes blurred. This flaw, which we assert is magnified when 48 Halberstam, The Coldest Winter, pp.372 -3. 49 Ibid., p.379. a significant battlefield change takes place during the course of a war (an intra-war surprise), is at the heart of the intelligence-policy nexus.
One of the interesting patterns that emerges from the Tet case is the difference between the sources of intelligence that were used by field analysts and those used by analysts and managers at CIA headquarters. 50 There was also a difference in the way that incoming information was interpreted by field analysts who seemed to be less influenced by the preferred strategic vision and strategic assumptions held by three other groups: the top brass at Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), the policy principals in Washington, and the senior analysts and managers.
Strategic Context
During the Fall of 1967, President Lyndon Johnson was experiencing mounting political pressure to show progress in Vietnam as he headed into an election year. This led Administration officials to pressure the CIA for analysis that would help to shore up domestic support for the war. In September 1967, National Security Advisor, Walt Rostow, asked the DCI's Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs, George Carver, for 'a list of positive (only) developments in the war effort.' 51 In November, President Johnson recalled his Ambassador to Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, and MACV commander, General William Westmoreland, to Washington to give a series of congressional briefings and public speeches to boost support for the war. It was here that Westmoreland uttered the infamous phrase about being seeing the 'light at the end of the tunnel' in Vietnam at a press conference. 52 Thus, during the period immediately preceding the Tet Offensive, the Johnson Administration was working hard to boost positive public perceptions and expectations regarding progress in the war. These efforts would boomerang, becoming a negative force multiplier generated by the psychological damage of Tet. local level. 55 The third phase involved American forces either destroying communist main force units or pushing them back away from South Vietnam. 56 The above-described ways and means were deployed toward two sets of strategic objectives. The first was to use American forces to create a shield blocking communist infiltration or invasion into the south, while ARVN engaged in counterinsurgency operations there, while the second strategic objective was kill communist forces at a higher rate than they could be replaced, so as to gradually ground down North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) combat power. 57 By the Fall of 1967, it was widely believed by MACV commanders and intelligence analysts that Westmoreland's 'shield and attrite' strategy was working. As James Wirtz illustrates compellingly, both Westmoreland and his intelligence analysts began to interpret communist behavior as responses or adjustments to the successes of 'shield and attrite'.
58 Thus the Westmoreland strategy had become a reified construct that was influencing the interpretation of communist signals and behavior. When, in the Fall of 1967, NVA main force units began to attack components of the barrier system that was being constructed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), it was assumed that the communists had realized that barrier would reinforce the success of the shield portion of the strategy, and so they felt compelled to try to slow down its completion. 59 However, when captured documents and public pronouncements indicated communist plans to initiate a popular uprising in the South, MACV commanders and analysts interpreted this as propaganda. They did so because (in their view) the attrition crossover point had already been achieved, and the communists would not have the combat power to sustain the kind of offensive operations that could initiate the general uprising.
60
Saigon Station Gets it Right
In late November and early December of 1967, analysts at CIA's Saigon Station led by Robert Layton produced a series of three reports that accurately assessed the likelihood of a general communist offensive during the early winter period. 61 The first two reports were produced on 21 November and 8 December, and the third report was produced on 19 December. These assessments were based largely on captured enemy documents and prisoner interrogation reports, which were the types of sources that MACV analysts and analysts at CIA headquarters were less likely to use. 62 The first report in late November concluded that the communists had shifted strategy from protracted war and were preparing an all-out offensive designed to undercut America's will to continue fighting. 63 The second assessment produced on 8 December predicted that the communist offensive would begin around the start of the Tet holiday and would include 'both large scale continuous attacks by main force units, primarily in mountainous areas close to the border sanctuaries and widespread guerrilla attacks on large US/GVN units in rural and heavily populated areas'. 64 This report was accurate including the second phase of the offensive. It also posited correctly that the communists were attempting to lure American forces out to the border areas and away from the urban targets of the coming offensive. 65 The third report, which was produced on 19 December, drew on new, corroborating indicators, and elaborated upon the prescient predictions put forward in the second report. This analysis posited that the communists had probably overestimated their ability to carry out countrywide attacks successfully, and so the attacks would probably fail militarily, but that the communists were committed to the widespread offensive nonetheless.
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Overall these three assessments from Saigon Station produced 6-10 weeks before Tet could have provided policy-making principals in Washington accurate warning of what was to come at the start of the Tet holiday.
The Saigon Station assessments were sent to George Carver, the Special Assistant for Vietnam Affairs (SAVA). Carver was in an unusual position as an analytical manager because of his close contacts with senior White House and Pentagon officials. 67 Upon receiving the 8 December assessment, Carver sent it to the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) for appraisal. The OCI critiqued the Saigon Station analysis for putting too much stock in captured documents which might be propaganda or disinformation. OCI also disagreed with Saigon Station's inference that the communists had changed their strategy from one of protracted warfare to a more forward leaning offensive orientation.
68 OCI thus stuck with the pre-existing CIA assessment. This OCI assessment was consistent with a new CIA HQ assessment held that the communists would continue to pursue a protracted war strategy because their military capability had been eroding over the last year or so. 69 It should be noted that this view of communist strategy is similar to the view held by MACV analysts and commanders in that it was influenced by the reification of the Westmoreland strategy (i.e. the notion that his strategy was working and thus the communists were forced to shape their strategy to take this into account).
Ultimately George Carver did pass the Saigon Station assessments on to Walt Rostow, but he did so under a cover letter in which he said they 'should 63 not be read as the considered opinion of this agency'. 70 The cover letter also reiterated the consensus CIA HQ assessment that the communists would continue their protracted war strategy. 71 Carver seriously undercut what might have been a very useful warning, but was telling Rostow what he (and LBJ) wanted to hear.
Late Warnings and Reactions
During the first two weeks of January 1968, indicators of an imminent communist offensive began to trickle in at both the tactical and operational level. During the first week of January, Lieutenant General Frederick Weyand, who was the II Field Force commander (and was thus responsible for the III Corps Tactical Zone [CTZ] and Saigon), began to receive intelligence that a communist offensive was pending.
72 Based on the strength of these indicators, Weyand persuaded Westmoreland to postpone a planned operation in the border area that would have taken a significant number of his troops away from Saigon at Tet. 73 It is clear that had Weyand not heeded the intelligence and pressed Westmoreland, the communists would have had greater success in their offensive. Thus, at least in the III CTZ, the Tet Offensive cannot be said to represent an intelligence failure in the traditional sense. The consumers (Weyand and Westmoreland) both heeded the warnings of the producers: the field analysts.
Indeed, by the second week of January, General Westmoreland had received enough intelligence from various tactical and operational sources to become convinced a countrywide communist offensive might be launched before the month was over. On 15 January, Westmoreland phoned South Vietnamese President Thieu and told him that he thought the odds of such an offensive occurring before Tet to be 60/40. 74 By the early morning of 30 January, the day the communist offensive was to be launched, Westmoreland was so concerned he sent out a flash priority message to all of his commanders calling for a maximum level of alert. 75 He also contacted every one of his senior commanders individually to warn them of the likelihood of an imminent widespread communist offensive. 76 While Westmoreland had at least two weeks to seriously ponder the prospect of a country-wide communist offensive and to prepare his forces for it, the same cannot be said of the policy-making principals in Washington. Even though there were analytical products like the Saigon Station assessments that could have provided the principals with upwards of two months' worth of warning, the 70 potential policy value of those products was undercut by analytical managers at CIA headquarters like George Carver who, in retrospect, had been pressured to do so from the Johnson Whitehouse. This 'intelligence to please' helped drive LBJ from politics.
Tet: Final Observations
The failure to warn policy-makers of the approaching Tet Offensive cannot be classified simply as a producer-based intelligence failure because the analytical community developed products that accurately predicted the nature and timing of the communist offensive two months before the event. But to what extent can it be considered to be a consumer-based 'failure of intelligence', meaning a failure by policy-principals in Washington? Because accurate analytical products from Saigon Station were undercut by Carver and other IC analytical managers, we cannot say that the principals received unambiguous warning and failed to craft a proper policy response. On the other hand, it is perhaps prudent to ask what the principals would have done if they had received such an unambiguous warning two months before the attacks were launched? Would they have clung to the established assumptions that had held Westmoreland and his MACV analysts in sway for most of 1967? Would they have rejected the incoming intelligence because it didn't match their core assumption about dwindling communist combat power and the effectiveness of the American shield strategy? What sorts of difficult public policy changes could they have considered making over a two-month span that would have made a difference at the strategic level? Certainly in hindsight, preparing the American people for a communist offensive might have mitigated the psychological shock that occurred in the wake of the Tet Offensive. However, without the benefit of hindsight it is equally true that the Johnson Administration (like others) was averse to incurring the inherent political risks of admitting errors. They had pushed the IC to provide 'only good news' and the senior managers had complied.
Perhaps the most interesting pattern that emerges from the Tet Offensive case is that CIA analysts in the field performed so much better than analysts back at the CIA headquarters in Langley in terms of their ability to provide timely and accurate predictive analysis. As Alexander Ovodenko points out, this could be explained by the fact that the analysts in the field made use of different types of sources (e.g. captured documents and enemy interrogations) than those available to the analysts back at headquarters. 77 The fact that the field analysts at Saigon Station performed better than the HQ analysts and their managers goes against the grain of the dominant pattern of inference that emerges from the agent-principal paradigm: a paradigm which would lead us to expect that the agents (e.g. the field analysts) would take advantage of their location in the operational environment to manipulate informational asymmetries between 77 Ovodenko, 'Visions of the Enemy from the Field and from Abroad', pp.121-2.
themselves and the principals in order to pursue independent policy agendas. 78 If anything, it was the principals and analyst-managers like Carver who seemed inclined to shape analytical products so that they were more supportive of pre-existing policy agendas. Psychologically it seems that the 'closer to the top' of the hierarchy that one gets in the intelligence-policy nexus, the less willing are individuals to examine new information in an agnostic fashion.
Case 3: The 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan
Discovering 'the truth' is the goal of most intelligence collectors and conveying this truth to policy-makers who need it is the primary mission of every intelligence analyst. The biblical quest for the truth, 'And ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free' (John 8:32), is engraved into the marble wall in the entrance to the Headquarters Building at the CIA. However, finding truth often starts with a debate about an opponent's intent and probable courses of action (COAs), and sometimes decision-makers defy even the best analyst's predictions. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is one such case.
In April 1978, a bloody military coup took place in Afghanistan that brought to power a small group of Soviet-trained officers and their political partners in the fledgling Afghan Communist Party. Over the course of the next 18 months, the new Afghan leaders quickly moved to build a political alliance with their socialist patrons in Moscow, and on 5 December 1978 a treaty was signed between the two countries which three weeks later would become part of the legal foundation for the coming Soviet intervention. 79 By rapidly instituting an array of bad policies too long to list here, 80 the new communist Afghan leadership quickly inspired a country-wide rebellion. As their internal control ebbed in the spring and summer of 1979, the tempo of Soviet involvement military increased. However, as late as 23 December 1979, the Soviet news media was denying Western claims that Red Army troops were mobilized for intervention in Afghanistan. Pravda referred to these claims as 'pure fabrications,' quoting Afghan President Hafizullah Amin as saying: 'The Soviet Union has never infringed on our sovereignty... is not doing so, and never will'. forces began their invasion of Afghanistan, and shortly thereafter assassinated Mr Amin. American policy officials, including President Jimmy Carter, almost unanimously expressed surprise over the Soviet move -especially its size and scope. Over the subsequent years, as referenced in the Foreign Policy article above, the Soviet invasion has become considered by some observers to be a 'top 10' producer-based failure for the American IC. 82 With the benefit of history, and the subsequent declassification of various documents and firsthand reports from participants, we can now make a more nuanced assessment of the American producers and consumers in this case.
What the new data tell us is that Soviet decision-makers did not fully finalize their plans until mid-December 1979: only two weeks before the large-scale operation began on 24 December of that year. However, tantalizing statements appearing in Soviet military journals early in 1979 indicate that Soviet theorists were building their case for the containment of 'imperialist' aggression. Colonel K. Vorobiev stated: 'Experience shows that only by using armed force can one defend the revolutionary conquests from the attacks of imperialist interventionists, surprise the attacks of the enemies of social progress, and assure the development of a country proceeding along a socialist path'. 83 Much like the American Cold War imagery of communist dominos falling from Vietnam, Afghanistan's internal troubles were perceived in the Kremlin as being fomented by the Soviet Union's enemies, namely the US and China. Articles in the official Soviet press spoke of increased infiltration by 'counter-revolutionary' forces and warned that the USSR could not remain indifferent to Pakistani and Chinese cooperation directed against Afghanistan. to October 1979, eventually recommending against further Soviet involvement on the grounds that it lacked a clear military mission. 85 However, a month earlier an official CIA Alert Memorandum dated 14 September was sent from Admiral Stansfield Turner (then Director of Central Intelligence) to President Carter and other senior officials warning: 'The Soviet leaders may be on the threshold of a decision to commit their own forces to prevent the collapse of the regime and to protect their sizable stakes in Afghanistan'. 86 According to the CIA's Douglas MacEachin, this memorandum also observed that Moscow was sensitive to the potentially open-ended military and political costs that could result from such a venture. Because of this sensitivity, if the Soviets eventually did increase their military role, they were likely to do so only incrementally -raising the number of military advisors, expanding involvement in combat operations, and possibly bringing in small units to provide security in key cities. The Alert Memorandum further acknowledged that, even if the commitment initially was limited to incremental steps, the Soviets would risk amplifying their stake in the ultimate outcome, making it harder to resist further increasing their military commitment if their initial steps did not produce the results they sought. 87 Clearly, the IC producers had first warned the main consumer (President Carter) about the threat in September, but the specifics (dates, size, and scope) were lacking. In retrospect, it is clear these details were lacking because declassified documents now show that they had not been decided by the Soviet leadership.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War has witnessed the release of additional documents and memoirs that provide a better understanding of the Soviets' conflicting views. One of the best examples is the work by Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, 88 who reports both on the KGB head Uri Andropov's key role in promoting the invasion to Secretary Brezhnev, as well the uniformed military's strong opposition (only two weeks before the invasion). Additional Soviet perspectives are provided by KGB officials Victor Cherkashin and Oleg Kalugin. 89 Russian sources report that on 8 December Brezhnev gave KGB Chief Andropov, Premier Gromyko and Defense Secretary Ustinov verbal approval for the intervention and the official documents were signed a few days later. 90 According to one American Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) analyst working at the time for the National Security Agency (NSA), 'this order resulted in the buildup of Soviet Guards and Motorized Rifle Divisions and the mobilization of Airborne troops that I observed in my job as a Traffic Analyst in mid-December 1979'. 91 US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski later indicated this SIGINT material was funneled to President Carter very quickly. After personally reading intelligence reports that a second Soviet airborne battalion had arrived in Afghanistan, Carter told Brezinski that he wanted to make that information on Soviet movements public by 15 December. 92 However, there was concern inside the Administration over how to release the information in a 'sanitized' manner: clearly reflecting a need to protect the sources and methods of intel collection. 93 On 17 December the quickly evolving Afghan situation was taken up at a meeting of senior national security officials (initially called to address the Iran hostage crisis). At that meeting, Admiral Turner (updating the agency's 14 September Alert Memorandum) reported that the recent movement of new Soviet units to Afghanistan (including a third airborne battalion added to their existing forces at Bagram airbase) raised the number of Soviet military personnel there to an estimated 5300. He also indicated that two new Soviet command posts had been created just north of the Afghan border, that two more divisions in the vicinity appeared readied for movement, and that a logistic buildup of air assets was underway. 94 According to the record of the meeting, Director Turner stated:
CIA does not see this as a crash buildup but rather as a steady, planned buildup, perhaps related to Soviet perceptions of a deterioration of the Afghan military forces and the need to beef them up at some point... We believe that the Soviets have made a political decision to keep a proSoviet regime in power and to use military force to that end if necessary. They either give this a higher priority than SALT [the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty being debated at that time in the US Congress] or they may believe it is irrelevant to SALT.
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On 19 December, the President of the United States, who according to Brzezinski had been monitoring the daily intel reports on Iran and Afghanistan for some time, was officially conveyed this information in a new Alert Memorandum. 96 Two days later, on 21 December, six days after Carter's initial suggested date for release, the Administration began releasing details of the expanded Soviet deployments both inside Afghanistan and on the border.
Neither a Producer nor Consumer Failure: A Strategic Imperative
The fact that the President and his national security team took no significant outward actions based on the string of warnings of a possible Soviet invasion that had started in September 1979 does not make this a case of failure by either the consumers or the producers of intelligence. The record is clear: Carter was not only informed by the IC, but he was intensely focused on the region after the Iranian hostage crises began on 4 November. Carter viewed the evolving Soviet-Afghan situations through that critical lens, and he was involved in deciding when to go public with the information of the Soviet build-up, initially pushing for 15 December. One might ask, why would the US President not act more boldly to try and prevent the USSR from invading Afghanistan? What would be gained, what might be lost? These sorts of strategic decisions are made by senior officials considering various courses of action (COAs). As well-described in Graham Allison's seminal work Essence of Decision (1971), any potential COA must be evaluated for the following: the national interest involved, the likeliness for success in achieving that interest, and the risk (cost) of failure. What were US national interests in Afghanistan? Certainly, in very broad terms any Soviet expansion was generally viewed as negative for the USA in the broader public narrative of the Cold War. However, since the late 1950s the USA had (rightly or wrongly) informally ceded Afghanistan to the Soviet sphere of influence and instead focused its strategy of containment on the borders of Iran and Pakistan. 97 For the USA in 1979, Afghanistan was a peripheral geo-political interest, but Soviet activities in the region mattered to the USA because of turmoil in Iran, an oil-rich state which it was 'losing' to revolution, but also did not want to also 'lose' to the USSR.
Given this basic premise, we should consider the alternative COA options that President Carter might have pondered:
(1) Taking a page from President Kennedy's public confrontation with the USSR over missiles in (3) Carter could take no bolder action than the private demarches, which were rebuffed. By following this path his team had time to prepare the public statements concerning their shock and outrage over this 'surprise' invasion, and to formulate the outlines of the Carter Doctrine. Even though the US threatened no direct military response, the Soviets could be made to pay a price in world outrage. Later, they would pay in the loss of the ongoing SALT II talks, in the US-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics, and in the cancellation of grain exports from the USA.
Finally, the record now suggests that we must consider an even more fascinating hypothesis: the US 'did nothing' to prevent the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan because such an invasion was the fulfillment of an American policy goal (albeit one not expressed publically). One part of the record is clear: the United States had begun to support the Afghan resistance following the issuance of a classified finding signed by Carter on 3 July 1979. 99 This covert program, later popularized by the book and movies titled 'Charlie Wilson's War', 100 is generally associated with President Reagan, under whose watch it was greatly expanded and popularized. However, what is most perhaps the most intriguing question may be the intent behind Carter's policy: what outcome was Carter was trying to achieve with the covert program that was initiated under his watch? In a news conference on 28 December 1979, President Carter described the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a blatant violation of international norms and a 'grave threat to peace'. In his memoirs Carter recalls: 'The worst disappointment to me personally was the immediate and automatic loss of any chance for the early ratification of the SALT II treaty. Furthermore, the situation created a threat to both Iran and Pakistan which had not existed previously. If the Soviets could consolidate their hold on Afghanistan, the balance of power in the entire region would be drastically modified in their favor, and they might be tempted toward further aggression. We were resolved to do everything feasible to prevent such a turn of events'.
101 These statements may be true after the Soviet invasion, but they have no relation to the question at hand: what was Carter trying to achieve by supporting the Afghan rebels in the months leading up to the Soviet action?
In presenting history this way, Carter may have been telling 'the truth', but was it 'the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?' Alternatively, were his memoirs sanitized so that: (1) he could maintain his strong public image as a man of peace and champion of human rights; or (2) he did indeed regret the loss of the SALT II treaty, but also did not want to publically admit that his policy of supporting the Afghan rebels had helped motivate the Soviet 99 invasion, and as a result ruined the chance for the treaty's passage. These speculations only became potentially credible two decades later when Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski told a French newspaper that he wrote to the President on 3 July 1979 and stated that Carter's decision to provide aid to the Afghan resistance (in the classified presidential finding) would induce a Soviet intervention. On the day of the Soviet invasion (24 December), he claims to have written to Carter: 'We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War'. Further documentary evidence provided by the Carter Library seems to confirm this claim. In a 26 December memo Brzezinski writes to Carter stating:
As I mentioned to you a week or so ago, we are now facing a regional crisis [emphasis in original]. Both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil, and Pakistan is both unstable and extremely apprehensive externally. If the Soviets succeed in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan acquiesces, the agelong dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled. Historically, the British provided the barrier to that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer state. We assumed that role in 1945, but the Iranian crisis has lead to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman Gulfs. Accordingly, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan poses for us an extremely grave challenge, both internationally and domestically. While it could become a Soviet Vietnam [emphasis added], the initial effects of the intervention are likely to be adverse for us. 102 In the ensuing discussions one can imagine the famous Carter Doctrine was formulated: 'Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force'. 103 Brzezinski also claimed in the 1998 interview: 'Indeed, for almost 10 years, Moscow had to carry on a war unsupportable by the government, a conflict that brought about the demoralization and finally the breakup of the Soviet empire'. 104 Whether or not the reader is convinced by Brzezinski's exact memory, for the focus of this paper the argument can no longer be made that Carter was surprised by the Soviet invasion. By 'doing little or nothing' to stop the invasion in Afghanistan when 'doing something' held very few rewards, Carter's decision was both rational and prudent. Moreover, if Brzezinski's memory is historically correct, then baiting the Soviets into an 'Afghan trap' was the President Carter's conscious policy objective all along. We concur with Robert Gates who observes the following: 'In fact, Carter and Brezinksi saw the Soviets beginning to increase work on a covert response nine months before [the invasion], and implemented a covert finding to help the insurgents resist the Soviets almost six months before the Soviet move'. 105 As such, no producer-based surprise or intelligence failure took place, and the ultimate consumer (President Carter) may have achieved exactly what he first intended, even though (perhaps to his chagrin) doing so later resulted in the loss of SALT II.
Why Correct History?
It is clear from these three cases that rarely are the genuine stories behind so called 'intelligence failures' as simplistic as they are portrayed in the popular press. Likewise, one of the major goals of the social sciences, to build conceptual models that then allow theorizing of various levels to take place, often require a dilution of history's important nuances. The complexity of the real world and the lack of clarity that often permeates the intelligence-policy nexus is one that is rarely satisfying for people wanting to know 'the truth' of history years later. As events unfold in real time, sometimes the best that can be hoped for is 'muddling through' by the participants. However, eventually history can be written more accurately -even if it takes years for sufficient data to become available. With better history, better social science will result, but first the history must be told accurately.
Regrettably, much of the American record remains classified, and the level of understanding that we have of the dynamics of the consumer-producer relationships inside the three cases varies considerably. For example we simply don't have the level of detail regarding the interaction between producers and consumers in the Afghan case that we were able to see in the Vietnam and Korea cases. On the Soviet side, almost all of the KGB officials both in the field and in Moscow were for greater military involvement, while most of the high-ranking Soviet military officers were against it. This may simply be a product of traditional Soviet-style bureaucratic politics in which the inclination for subordinates to tell their bosses what they think they want to hear is particularly strong in an authoritarian state. It could be the case that subordinate KGB officers simply lined up behind the known opinion of their boss (Yuri Andropov) and alternatively, subordinate generals also voiced opinions which echoed those holding higher rank. Likewise, on the American side, we have not been able to find any other memoirs that affirm Brzezinski's claim that Carter's Afghan policies were consciously designed to lure the Soviets into a quagmire. Brzezinski might be faulted a decade later for remembering things in a manner which appears to make him more prescient in the Le Nouvel Observateur interview, however the declassified NSA memo from 26 December sited above from the Carter Library lends credence to his claim. The record is now clear: President Carter was keenly focused on both Iran and Afghanistan, and feigning 'surprise' must have been deemed valuable in the subsequent public diplomacy, the articulation of the Carter Doctrine, and execution of the information campaign against the USSR.
But why does it matter if an event is mis-labeled an 'intelligence failure' and history not corrected later on? First, the broader American IC can do very little to defend itself when the predictable wave of criticism is heaped upon it by pundits in the months and years following events, but should its personnel suffer under these dark clouds forever? It is a typical American trait to believe that any failure can either be traced to a fault in either in a process or in the actions of a person. If the fault lies in the process, the process must be 'fixed' so that the fault does not recur. If the fault is in the actions of a person, then the answer is to determine if there was insufficient training (really a process problem -and one which can be fixed); or whether the person was negligent, incompetent, or traitorous (requiring the person to suffer variable consequences). However, events that are mislabeled as intelligence failures when they are actually failures in leadership (or even successes, as perhaps Afghanistan was for Carter) might result in procedures and protocols that were not broken being 'fixed', and/or persons who were behaving properly becoming scapegoats. All of this 'fixing' involves investigations, studies, commissions, and reorganizations that, if there is no legitimate problem, result in wasted resources and new layers of bureaucracy that can be detrimental to intelligence organizations and personnel. The confidence of both policy-makers and the public are eroded, causing policy-makers to become more likely to disregard their intelligence professionals in the future. After all, 'if they failed on X, why should I believe what they say about Y? ' The bottom line is this: secret activities are inherently distrusted in open, democratic societies. The actions of intelligence officers -deceiving others, using false identities to obtain information, stealing secrets -are much too close to those of a criminal for most Americans to feel comfortable. American popular media feeds this distrust by portraying as heroes many 'rogues' who rebel against the (evil) intelligence organization to do the right thing. When the real world also presents fictional 'intelligence failures' to mask failures of policy or leadership, the perpetrators do a disservice both to the intelligence officers who take on real risks and hardships to do their jobs, and to the current and future policy-makers who will believe these falsehoods and will likely try to 'fix' the problem. In the case of Afghanistan, it is clear that President Carter decided to feign public surprise in order to build support for his developing anti-Soviet policies. A pragmatist can even understand why this public deception served national security goals. But how long must the charade continue?
While it may be fair to expect intelligence professionals to stay silent and accept unfair criticism in order to protect sources and methods, and it may be unrealistic to expect politicians to be truthful in their memoirs, the academic community is professionally obligated to eventually step in and correct the record. The human stakes are very high in the 'real' (or non-academic) world of national security and intelligence. Mistakes ruin lives and often get people killed. Wars start and nation-states sometimes fail as a result. We profoundly believe it is very important to avoid learning the wrong lessons from past cases like Tet or Afghanistan because those wrong lessons might lead to costly or even deadly mistakes in future national security challenges. If we are to truly learn from our past and develop our intelligence community to meet future needs we must separate real failures, like Korea, from the false examples like Tet and Afghanistan.
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